To Copy What is Right and True \u3cem\u3eor\u3c/em\u3e The Liability of the Official Court Reporter Who Does Not by Taylor, Arnold
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 4 Article 4
1974
To Copy What is Right and True orThe Liability of
the Official Court Reporter Who Does Not
Arnold Taylor
O'Hara, Ruberg , Cetrulo, and Osborne
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Taylor, Arnold (1974) "To Copy What is Right and True or The Liability of the Official Court Reporter Who Does Not," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 62 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol62/iss4/4
To Copy What Is Right And True
Or
The Liability Of The Official Court
Reporter Who Does Not
By ARoLD TAYLOR*
I have brought the ink-pot and the palette as being the
objects which are in the hands of Thoth; hidden is that which
is in them. Behold me in the character of a scribel ... I have
copied the words of the great and beautiful god each day
fairly. 0 Harmachis, thou didst order me and I have copied
what is right and true, and I do bring it unto thee each day."
Introduction
Experts such as physicians, engineers and lawyers are gen-
erally well compensated for the exercise of their particular skills
but they also have a necessarily concomitant liability. Because
these professional groups hold themselves out to the public as
qualified, they are bound to suffer the consequences of their
negligent acts. Just as the physician must, in addition, often
accept responsibility for the acts of his agent-nurse, so too
must the lawyer accept responsibility for the mistakes of his
administrative staff. While the medical profession has not entirely
understood the rationale of this principle, lawyers more readily
accept it. Yet the lawyer, no less than the physician, would be
distressed by the notion of being burdened with responsibility
for the misfeasance or nonfeasance of a person not under his
control; each could be expected to consider this an unacceptable
risk. Even so, a lawyer involved in almost any type of litigation
runs that risk practically every day. He may rely upon a judge
-A.B. 1971, J.D. 1965, University of Kentucky; Member of Kenton County,
Kentucky, and American Bar Associations; Associate in the firm of O'Hara,
Ruberg Cetrulo and Osborne; practicing in Covington, Kentucky.1 Of the Ink-Pot and Palette, EGYPTr& Boo OF = DEAD.
CoURT REPoTERs. .
to see that some action is taken, he may entrust documents to a
court clerk, or he may request a court reporter to prepare a
transcript of evidence for an appeal. If the judge does not com-
plete the act, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects him
from the consequences of his inaction; if the clerk loses the
documents, he, a state official, is probably clothed with sovereign
immunity; but if the court reporter fails to prepare the transcript
in time, should the responsibility for the consequent failure of
an appeal fall wholly upon the lawyer?
It may have been the boast of the common law that there
was no wrong without a remedy, but the above examples clearly
contradict that assertion. Of course, in an earlier day this incon-
sistency was explained by the status of the judge and clerk as
arms of the sovereign; since the sovereign was incapable of
doing wrong, the judge and the clerk could commit no wrong for
which a remedy need be supplied.
Certainly the exigencies of the judicial system may well de-
mand that a judge be supplied immunity from the unhappy
consequences of his judicial acts. Likewise, persuasive arguments
can be made in favor of immunizing the court clerk. It is sub-
mitted, however, that no justification whatsoever exists for sim-
ilarly shielding the court reporter from the legal consequences
of his acts and that the Kentucky Court of Appeals, if confronted
with this issue, should therefore scrupulously refrain from erecting
such a barrier.
In order to intelligently consider this complex question an
examination must first be made of: (1) the functions of the court
reporter; (2) his responsibilities to litigants; and (3) the position
he occupies in the judicial structure.
I. THE NATURE OF THm OFicm_ CoURT BEPoRTER's Roix2
A. The Status of the Official Court Reporter in the Judicial
Structure
While some jurisdictions have adopted the view that an
2 It should be noted that these general principles apply only to situations
where the reporter is treated as the official court stenographer, not where he serves
as an employee of a party, as at the taking of a deposition before trial. Lester v.
Lester, 380 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sullivan Co. 1972). Such a rule does not mean that a
privately employed reporter cannot be held responsible for his negligence or
breach of contract, but simply that such liability is not covered by these principles
or this article.
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offcial court reporter is an officer of the state,' the majority rule
seems to be that he is not a public officer, but merely an employee
of the state.4 The Kentucky rule is that "the official court reporter
is a statutory officer of the Court, subject to the control and dis-
cretion of the judge."5
It has been held that a reporter cannot be an official reporter
unless he has taken the statutory oath.6 The Kentucky Court
of Appeals, however, has stressed that any stenographer who
temporarily takes the place of an official stenographer becomes a
de facto officer, subject to the control and discretion of the
court.7 He need not be appointed officially, or take an oath, if
he has assumed the duties with the tacit consent of all. The
Court of Appeals has, indeed, apparently adopted the position
that the taking of an oath by the reporter in no way raises his
status beyond that of any other state employee.
B. The Functions of the Official Court Reporter
The primary role of the court reporter is to serve the litigants."
As an arm of the court he has the general duty of "preserving
a record of the evidence, and transcribing and certifying the
record for use on an appeal."9 Accordingly, the court reporter
is expected to act in a diligent and timely manner,'0 and a party
has a right to rely upon the presumption that he will properly
perform his duties." It should be noted, however, that it is not
the reporter's function to practice law for an attorney," and in
3 See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 267 S.W. 873 (Mo. 1924).4 Robbin v. Brewer, 236 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1970); Tom Green County v.
Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1946); cf., Butcher v. Tinkle, 183 S.W.2d 227
(Tex. 1944). •5 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Paul's Adm'r, 285 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950). The term
"officer of the court" is utilized in the language of several statutes, e.g., ALA. CODE,
tit. 13, § 261 (1958); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-13-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
485.040 (Vernon, Gum. Supp. 1974); WA.sm REv. CODE ANN. § 2.32.180 (Supp.
1972).
6 Cleary Bros. Constr. Co. v. Phelps, 24 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1945); In re Johnson's
Estate, 282 P. 1082 (Ore. 1929).
7 Walker v. Burgevin, 295 S.W. 997 (Ky. 1927).
8 Sebree v. Rogers, 102 S.W. 841 (Ky. 1907). Language in this case, to the
effect that the reporter is a "public official", should be considered overridden by the
langage of Louisville & N.R.R. v. Pau's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950).
International Shoe Company v. Carmichael, 105 So. 2d 389, 890 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1958).
10 Peacock v. State, 154 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1963).
11 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Pau's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950); Butler
Auto Sales, Inc. v. Skog, 199 A.2d 597 (R.I. 1964).12 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Paus Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950).
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Kentucky it is not the reporter's task to see that papers necessary
for an appeal are filed.' Beyond these broad functions gen-
eralizations are unsafe because the federal government and several
states have enacted sometimes widely differing statutes which
must be analyzed to determine the exact nature of a court re-
porter's function in a particular case.
1. Federal Statutory Provisions
Until the enactment of the Court Reporter's Act,1 4 there was
no federal law providing for the position of official court stenog-
rapher or requiring the stenographic reporting of any case. Those
who did function as reporters in federal trials were therefore not
considered officers of the United States. 5 Briefly, the Court Re-
porters Act provides that the reporters qualifications are to be
measured by standards formulated by the Judicial Conferences 6
and that the reporter is subject to the supervision of those con-
ferences and of the appointing court. Once qualified, he must
take an oath to faithfully perform the duties of his office; beyond
that, it is incumbent upon the district court to see that he com-
plies with the law.Y
Under the Act, the reporter's basic duties are: to attend and
record certain proceedings; to certify his notes and records and
promptly file them with the District Court Clerk; and to transcribe
various criminal matters specified by the statute. With regard
to the last of these, it is clear that Congress intended that, as a
minimum, the court reporter should record and transcribe the
arraignment and sentencing proceedings in every criminal case.
In contrast, the reporter is allowed considerable flexibility in the
transcription of civil matters.
13 Id. This case dealt with the filing of a "bill of exceptions", a document not
called for under our present rules governing appellate procedure, but this does not
affect the legal principle demonstrated.
14 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1968).
'5 Miller v. United States, 317 U.S. 192 (1942).
26 Attached to this article, as Appendix A, is a copy of the Federal Standards
of Qualifications for Official Court Reporters now in force. More recently, the
Judicial Conference has adopted a more specific qualifications plan, a copy of which
is attached as Appendix B. According to a letter of July 26, 1974 to the author
from William T. Barnes, Chief, Division of Personnel, Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, the earlier standards are still in force, but Mr. Barnes
expects the later standards, referred to herein as Appendix B, to be in effect and
operative by January 1, 1975.
17 Poo e v. United States, 250 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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The provisions of the Act, particularly those dealing with
criminal cases, have been held to be mandatory-not permissive.'
They cannot be overridden by local custom and practice nor can
the responsibilities they impose be shifted from the reporter to
the respective attorneys. 19 Still, strict compliance with this man-
date is not always required, and some courts have held that not
every violation of the Act constitutes prejudicial error.20 On
balance, however, sound policy dictates that such decisions
should be narrowly construed since compliance with the Act
is not difficult and a full and accurate transcript is of crucial
importance to appellate review.
2. State Statutory Provisions
Section 28.410(1) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [herein-
after KRS] requires that the court reporter "be skilled in his pro-
fession" and provides that he hold his office at the pleasure of
the presiding judge. The same requirements and regulations
are also applied to certain stenographic reporters other than
the official court reporter. KRS § 28.420, like the federal statute,
requires the reporter to take an oath to faithfully discharge the
duties of his office. Perhaps the broadest of these is the reporter's
obligation to fully record and report any proceeding wherein his
services are requested by either party or the court. Again paral-
lelling the Court Reporters Act, the Kentucky statute places added
emphasis on the reporter's role in criminal cases by requiring
the transcription of all proceedings in the criminal branch of the
circuit court in counties having a population of 150,000 or more.21
In addition to these statutory provisions, the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure govern the manner of recording proceedings and
transcribing evidence22 and have the force of positive law.23
18 Casalman v. Upchurch, 386 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
'9 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972); Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1966) cert.
denied, 889 U.S. 850 (1967); Fowler v. United States, 310 F.2d 66 (51 Cir.
1962).
20 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
21Woods v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1957). Additionally,
Woods held this statute to be mandatory, rather than permissive.22 Ky. BEv. STAT. § 28.430(3) (1971) t hereinafercited as KeS]; see gen-
eral Rules of Kentucky Court of Appeals [hereinafter cited as RCA].
2a3 KRS § 447.156; see Caldwell v. Harvey, 192 P.2d 62 (Cal. Ct App. 1948),
for liability of an attorney when a court reporter failed in such duties.
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Though not required in Kentucky some states have court rules
requiring that the reporter perform certain acts necessary for the
protection of the appeal, such as obtaining extensions of time in
which to file a transcript.24 There are also several statutory pro-
visions requiring the reporter to post bond for the performance
of his duty, giving persons injured by the reporter a right to
recover under that bond.25
One question left unanswered by the Kentucky statute is how
long a stenographic reporter need retain his notes or transcripts.
Although there is generally a dearth of interpretative analysis in
Kentucky concerning the statutory duties of a reporter, one
opinion of the attorney general26 addresses itself to this very issue.
Noting the absence of an applicable statute or court rule, the
opinion advises that the most logical solution is to require that
such records be kept a reasonable period of time. So much is
manifest. The attorney general further suggests (in the words
of the opinion, "for what it is worth") that three years would be
adequate. What constitutes reasonableness, as always, depends
upon all the circumstances; but it is not clear, nor does the opinion
indicate, the basis for the attorney general's selection of a period
of three years. In civil cases the criterion used by the attorney
general might not be unwarranted, and several states do have
statutes requiring the preservation of notes for a stated period
of time;2 1 perhaps an effort should be made to establish a definite
time by statute in Kentucky as well. A better rule for criminal
cases might be that suggested by one federal court which, with
respect to the duty of the federal district clerk to preserve his
24 Moody v. Crane, 199 P. 652 (Idaho 1921).2 5 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 457.16 (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 1-1102,
58-812, 59-812, 59-815 (Supp. 1973); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:961 (B), (D)(2)(1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-13-45 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-56-7 (1953);
see also Johnson v. Ward, 59 So. 806 (Miss. 1912)- International Shoe Company
v. Carmichael, 105 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
20 Ky. Arr'y GN. Op. 41,686 (1958).
27id.28 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 262 (1959) (apparently notes are to be kept
permanently and turned over to clerk upon reporter's retirement); OKILA. STAT.
A i. tt. 20, § 1006 (Supp. 1973) (varying from five to twenty-two years, de-
pending upon the type of case); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-5-4 (1969) (notes are
property of state, to be held by clerk twelve years or two years after death of
reporter); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (1971) (full year); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 86.23.070 (Supp. 1972) upon order of court, seven years after entry
of trial judgment in civil cases and fifteen years in criminal matters); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 5-79 (1957) (ten years, or sooner if a transcript has been furnished a
party)-
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records for not less than ten years, 20 advised that as a matter of
policy it would be wise to preserve the original records for as long
as the period of detention. 30
II. V~aurm-s oF REPO R=T FAmI BE
Human capacity for error being what it is, the number of
ways in which a court reporter may fail in his duties is infinite.
Certain broad areas of deficiency readily appear, however, and
can be studied with a view toward noting common elements and
as a basis for a discussion of available remedies. It should be
noted at the outset that not all failures involve an element of fault.
For instance, a reporter may die before completing his records.
In such cases, even though no liability exists, some of the remedial
alternatives discussed hereinafter may be employed to reduce
the hardships on the parties.
Certain forms are required for the preparation of a record
and transcription of evidence for civil matters,21 and parallel
forms exist for criminal cases. 2 The reporter might fail to follow
these prescribed forms and thereby prejudice a litigant's case.
A somewhat more common error is the failure to report a portion
of the trial, such as opening statements3 3 or colloquy between
court and counsel concerning the admissibility of evidence. 34
The reporter might also neglect to record tendered instructions, 5
closing arguments," or stipulations between counsel.3 7 He could
further willfully or negligently deprive an indigent of a transcript,
even though provision is ordered by a court,3 or completely fail
to transcribe the record,3 possibly as a result of his failure to
preserve his records.4°
29 28 U.S.C. § 753(b).
30 Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
3 'KRS § 28.430(3) (1971); Pendleton v. a ard Bank and Trust Co., 272
S.W. 917 (Ky. 1925); Taylor Coal Co. v. Miller, 182 S.W. 920 (Ky. 1916).
32 See generally RCA; Mills v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1944);
Meek v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W. 1032 (Ky. 1926).
83 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972).
34 Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 850 (1967).35 United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1969).36 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972); Casalman v. Upchurch, 386 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967); Fowler
v. United States, 810 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1962).
37 Butler Auto Sales, Inc. v. Skog, 199 A.2d 597 (R.I. 1964).
38 Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
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In some jurisdictions the reporter has statutory duties to
expeditiously prepare and file the transcript of record,41 and to
obtain extensions of time in which to file papers.42 Obviously,
there may be failures in respect to these matters. Likewise, in the
federal courts, the reporter may fail to comply with the provisions
of the Court Reporters Act regarding the filing of various docu-
ments.
With these general examples of reporter errors as a backdrop,
logically the next step should be an analysis of the remedies courts
have fashioned to minimize the hardships on the parties and to
reimburse those that have suffered loss.
III. B En=LkI ACrION BY TMh COURTS
The search for justice has compelled couirts to develop rem-
edies to aid litigants who, because of reporter's misfeasance or
nonfeasance, have been prejudiced through no fault of their own.
For example, post conviction relief is available in criminal cases
where the accused has been prejudiced by the reporter's error.43
Beyond remedies which are peculiar to criminal proceedings,
there are numerous avenues of remedial action equally ap-
plicable to both civil and criminal matters. A condition precedent
to the granting of any of these remedies, however, is a demon-
stration of prejudice; and where the party complaining of the
absence or incompleteness of a transcript cannot have been
prejudiced thereby, the court will find little reason to allow relief.
Under the Court Reporters Act a court must determine that
the reporter's error is harmless to be non-prejudicial;44 but the
court must find that no harm resulted in fact, and cases finding
39 United States v. Washabaugh, 435 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1970); Johnson v.
Ward, 59 So. 806 (Miss. 1912).
40 See Aeby v. United States, 409 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).41lInternational Shoe Company v. Carmichael, 105 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1958);
cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Paul's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950).
42 Moody v. Crane, 199 P. 652 (Idaho 1921); cf. Clement v. Reclamation
Board, 200 P.2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
43 See generally Ky. R. Casm. P. 11.42; see also Hefton v. United States, 839
F. Supp. 475 (D. Del. 1972) (proceeding to vacate sentence); the district court
held that it was not reversible error for a reporter to fail to transcribe closing
arguments until after the motion was filed, the case therefore being an example of
those which seem to allow exceptions to the Court Reporters Act, 28 U.S.C. §
8753(b) (1964), and which should therefore be construed narrowly. Nor will the
courts issue a writ of habeus corpus where a state is not at fault in the loss of a
reporter's notes. United States v. Pate, 318 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 934 (1972).
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error non-prejudicial are narrowly construed. 45 Thus where a
reporter's error is alleged, the complaining party has the burden
of showing how the alleged error or omission is prejudicial.46
This rule was applied in Edwards v. United States,47 where a
reporter's failure to record a colloquy between court and counsel
concerning the attempted introduction of character evidence was
declared harmless, since the trial court ultimately admitted proper
evidence.
If the requisite prejudice is shown, any court has sufficient
supervisory powers over its own administrative affairs, including
the preparation of the record,48 to effect an appropriate remedy.
The available alternatives fall into three broad areas: (1) actions
directly against the reporter; (2) actions taken to supply a record;
and (3) reversal of a judgment below, remanding the case for a
new trial.
A. Action Against the Reporter
A court may hold the reporter in contempt for failure to
transcribe his notes in a manner required by law49 or by order
of the court. As a result of such error, the reporter may also be
denied his fees or compelled to refund a portion thereof and
may be subjected to further penalties, monetary51 or otherwise,52
provided by statutes and rules of procedure.
One of the most effective remedies available to injured parties
is the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the reporter.a
45 United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1972).4GUnited States v. DiCanio, 245 F.2d 713 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
934 (1957); thus, in Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 905 (1964), the defendants-appellants failed to point out specific
error in arguments not transcribed, and the court held this to be insufficient
grounds on which to reverse. Note, however, that of the six original trial lawyers,
one was still in the case, making it possible for a trial lawyer to point out the error
lying in the unreported arguments. Such facts may prevent operation of the
principle enunciated in Upshaw, to the effect that without a total record, new
counsel in a case cannot effectively do his duty.
47374 F.2d 24 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).48 Hydramotive Mfg. Corp. v. SEC, 355 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1966); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Paus Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950); KRS § 28.410. But see
a peculiar result in Charles Brooks & Co. v. Gentry, 64 So. 214 (Miss. 1914).
49 United States v. Washabaugh, 435 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1970).50 Mills v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1945); Meek v. Common-
wealth, 283 S.W. 1032 (Ky. 1926); Pendleton v. Garrard Bank & Trust Co., 272
S.W. 917 (Ky. 1925); Taylor Coal Co. v. Miller, 182 S.W. 920 (Ky. 1916).51 E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-13-45 (1972).
52 International Shoe Company v. Carmichael, 105 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1953).
53 United States v. Metzger, 133 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1943); Richardson v. Can-
non, 506 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1974); Trodgen v. Judge, Daviess Circuit Court, 371
S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1963).
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Although one appellate court has held that it lacked sufficient
control over stenographers hired in courts below to issue such
writs, 4 this is not the general rule. In order to obtain issuance
of a mandamus, of course, the technical requirements must be
met. For example, since mandamus is in the nature of a personal
action, where the petitioner failed to seek the writ against a
specifically named individual, styling the respondent only as
"Judge, Daviess Circuit Court", is was held that there was no
proper respondent and the petition was denied.5 Nor will
mandamus be granted to compel one who formerly held an office
to perform the duties of that office; thus a petition was denied
where it was not sought until after the official reporter in question
had resigned his post.5 6
B. Actions to Supply a Record
The reporter's failure to supply a complete record is not always
the result of either negligence or willful misconduct. It might be,
for instance, that the reporter was not responsible for a particular
phase of the trial. Consequently, a variety of techniques have
been developed by courts to supply a record upon which an
appeal can be heard. The court may issue an order supplementing
the record,57 sustain a motion to correct a record,58 allow the filing
of the record out of time,59 or have a hearing between court and
counsel for the purpose of reconstructing the record. 0 There are,
in addition, rules automatically operable enabling litigants to
prepare a record for the appellate court in a manner other than
transcription of notes taken by the reporter.61
C. Granting of a New Trial
The granting of a new trial is set apart from other forms of
relief by its potential harm to the initially prevailing litigant.
Obviously that party must undergo again the hazards unique to
a jury trial, which can conceivably result in a complete reversal
54 Charles Brooks & Co. v. Gentry, 64 So. 214 (Miss. 1914).
55 Trodgen v. Judge, Daviess Circuit Court, 371 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1963).56 United States v. Oswald, 141 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1944).5 7 United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1971); Ky. R. Civ. P.
75.08.58 Butler v. Skog, 199 A.2d 597 (R.I. 1964); Ky. R. Crv. P. 60.01, 75.08.
tt Clement v. Reclamation Board, 200 P.2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Moody
v. Crane, 199 P. 652 (Idaho 1921).6 0 United States v. DiCanio, 245 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1957).
6 Ky. R. Civ. P. 75.13-14.
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without relation to substantive error in the original trial. Courts
are therefore reluctant to quickly set aside such judgments, and
the mere absence of a stenographic record is not necessarily an
adequate basis for granting a new trial, especially since there
exist other means for obtaining a record for the appellate court.62
The peculiarities of particular statutes may also affect the ap-
pellate court's power to grant this relief. Thus one court, applying
a statute which required a record to be filed before it could
entertain an appeal, denied a new trial where the reporter had
died before completing the record, holding that the case had to
be dismissed for want of prosecution. The decision was based
on the somewhat strained reasoning that since there was no
record, the court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.63
This is not the accepted rule, however; and ordinarily if the
appellate court is unable to determine whether a litigant's rights
have been violated by reason of the absence of all or part of the
record, the judgment below will be reversed and the case re-
manded for a new trial.64 Indeed, some states specifically provide
for this by statute.65
The question of whether the original prevailing litigant is
damaged by the granting of a new trial is open to discussion, but
it can rationally be argued that even if he is again successful,
both he and his attorney have suffered additional expenses as a
result of the second trial. The ultimately prevailing party may
have lost interest on money or suffered legal costs, or the attorney
may have lost the value of his legal services rendered at the second
trial.66 Whether these and other damages are recoverable from
the reporter is a question that will be discussed below, but before
reaching that point a consideration of some of the important
factors affecting the reporter's substantive liability is necessary.
To this point, the discussion has focused upon the role and
function of the official court reporter in order to establish a basis
62 Hydramotive Mfg. Corp. v. SEC, 344 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1966); Moore v.
Moore, 144 A.2d 765 (Del. 1969); Ky. R. Civ. P. 75.13-14.63 Morin v. Claflin, 61 A. 782 (Me. 1905).
64 United States v. Gracia-Bonifascio, 443 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Fowler v. United States, 310
F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1962).65 CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. §§ 914, 657.1 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1181(9) (1970); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,§ 654 (1967); OnE. REv. STAT. §
19.130(3) (1971).66 SC Waterman v. State, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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for deciding what constitutes negligence on the reporter's part.
Now we are confronted with the highly important practical
problem of whether the injured party will be able to obtain any
relief from the reporter. The significant considerations in this
context are: (1) whether the reporter is, in fact, immune from
liability; (2) whether the act of the reporter was the proximate
cause of the injury; (3) whether damages can be calculated with
legally sufficient precision; and (4) whether external factors such
as the contributory negligence of the attorney could affect the
reporter's ultimate liability.
IV. ImmuNrrY OF =r OFrIcI_ COURT REPORTER
A. The Federal Rule
The federal courts are firmly committed to the principle that
an official court reporter, in the discharge of his official responsi-
bilities, is protected by judicial immunity. The purpose of the
judicial immunity doctrine, the antiquity of which has been noted
by the United States Supreme Court," is to avoid intimidation
of the bench by insubstantial litigation.68 One federal court in
a case styled Stewart v. Minnick has even applied this doctrine
to a state court reporter. In that case the appellant had sued a
reporter and court clerk under the Civil Rights Act for their refusal
to furnish him a transcript of the prosecutor's closing argu-
ment.6 Since California was not amenable to a suit under the Act
and the acts alleged had been performed in the defendants'
capacities as quasijudicial officers, the court held that they were
6 7 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).68 It is felt that men considering public life would be deterred by potential
liability; that the drain upon the time of the official, caused by insubstantial
litigation would be great; that it is unfair to subject officials to liability for the
acts of their subordinates; that the duty of the official is to the public and not
the individual; and that valid and formal removal proceedings are more appropriate
ways to prompt proper action on the part of public officials. Bauers v. Heisel, 361
F.2d 581, 590 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967).
The federal courts' rule that an official court reporter is protected by judicial
immunity was not abolished by the Civil Rights Act. Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d
761 (7th Cir. 1969); Peckham v. Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1957).
The burden of raising the issue of judicial immunity is upon the parties, and
unless it is raised in the pleadings it will not serve as a defense. Washington v.
Official Court Reporter, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
It should also be noted that federal officers can avail themselves of this
doctrine of immunity by removing any action against them to a federal court.
28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1973).69 Stewart v. Minnick, 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969), citing Peckham v.
Scanlon, 241 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1957).
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clothed with judicial immunity. A better analysis for the federal
courts would seem to suggest looking to state law to determine
whether the court reporter is immune where the reporter involved
is a state court reporter. State law creates the position; state law
should determine its characteristics. If this were the test, the
decision in Stewart would have been different because California
decisions consistently have referred to the reporter as an officer
of the court and not of the state.70 It is important to note the
difference between an officer of the state and a mere state em-
ployee. While the former is usually accorded sovereign immunity,
the latter is not. Consequently, if an individual is a state employee
but is called an "officer of the court," he will still ordinarily have
no immunity, unless he falls within the pale of judicial immunity.
The same result would obtain in most jurisdictions outside Cali-
fornia, because the California rule that court reporters are not
officers of the state is the majority rule.
B. The State Rule
It is obvious that the status of the reporter under the Court
Reporters Act has influenced the federal decisions. For the de-
fense of sovereign immunity to be available to an individual
in a state case, however, he must be an officer of the state exer-
cising sovereign powers; some part of the sovereign power
of the state must have been delegated to him.71 While a few
jurisdictions consider the court reporter to be an official of the
state,72 the majority view seems to be that he is not an official,
but merely a state employee, and that he holds no sovereign
powers.73 Under this view the reporter clearly should not be, and
generally has not been, accorded either judicial or sovereign
immunity. Even under the principle that the reporter is merely
a state employee, however, one court has held that the status of
the reporter as an officer of the court meant that he was responsi-
ble to the court alone, and not the litigants.74 Most jurisdictions,
70 Clement v. Reclamation Board, 200 P.2d 196 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Cald-
well v. Harvey, 192 P.2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
71 Robbin v. Brewer, 236 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1970); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 163 So. 76 (Fla. 1935).
72 Sills v. Sills, 6 P.2d 1026 (Idaho 1931); State v. Mitchell, 267 S.W. 873
(Mo. 1924).
73R obbin v. Brewer, 236 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1970); Tom Green County v.
Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1946).
74 Wheeler v. Birch & Sons Constr. Co., 178 P.2d 331 (Wash. 1947).
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though, have as yet had no opportunity to decide the question.
Among the few landmark decisions in this area of the law is
a series of connected cases, each bearing the style Waterman v.
State, decided by the courts of New York between 1959 and 1966.
An action was filed in the New York Court of Claims against the
state of New York for personal injury damages incurred in an
automobile accident which resulted in judgment in favor of the
claimants, and the state appealed. Uiffortunately, the court
stenographer lost his notes and was unable to furnish a transcript
of the evidence. The appellate division vacated the judgment
and granted a new trial, whereupon the Court of Claims once
again gave judgment for the claimants. These second judgments,
in substantially the same amounts as were awarded in the first
trial, were paid by the state.
Shortly thereafter, the claimants filed an action against the
state alleging that because of the negligence of the reporter in
losing his notes they sustained damage, suffering expenses for the
second trial and loss of interest from the date of the first judgment
to the date of the judgment resulting from the second trial. Their
attorney also made a claim for the additional legal services-he
rendered at the second trial, alleging that this was required by
reason of the stenographer's negligence.
The attorney general argued that the court Stenographer
was a judicial officer, shielded from civil liability under the doc-
trine of judicial immunity and that although the state had waived
its sovereign immunity to a certain extent under the provisions
of the Court of Claims Act, it never intended to surrender such
immunity in the case of judicial officers. While recognizing that
the doctrine of judicial immunity was one of the oldest in Anglo-
American jurisprudence, designed to protect a judicial officer
from the consequences of his judicial acts, the court concluded
that the rule had no application and could not be successfully
asserted.75 It emphasized that
75 There are numerous cases styled Waterman v. State including the original
suits for personal injury damages, and suits for damage due to loss of the reporter's
notes. What we are primarily concerned with here are two of the reported cases.
The first (here styled textually Waterman I) is Waterman v. State, 232 N.Y.S.2d
22 (Ct. Cl. 1962). It was in this case that the court decided that judicial im-
munity did not protect court reporters, but the claims were dismissed because the
loss of the reporter's notes was not the "natural and probable cause" ofthe damage
sustained by the claimants. Id. at 27.
(Continued on next page)
1974]
Km-TcKY LAw JouRNA[
.. to be immune from civil responsibility the judicial officer
involved must be doing something in the nature of a judicial
function calling for weighing facts and evidence, considering
legal principles, and making a decision thereon."6
Although New York statutes provided that the stenographer was
an "officer of the court", the court rejected the state's contention
that the acts of the reporter were covered by the judicial im-
munity rule, stating:
A Court stenographer, notwithstanding the fact that he is an
Officer of the Court, by the very nature of his work performs
no judicial function. His duties are purely ministerial and
administrative; he has no power of decision. The Doctrine has
no application to the facts with which we are confronted
here. 77
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has as yet had no occasion to
rule upon the immunity of the court reporter, but if confronted
with the appropriate case, the Court should follow the well-
considered majority rule by holding that a court reporter is merely
an employee of the commonwealth with no defense of sovereign
immunity. This was the approach of the New York Court of
Claims in Waterman 1, and appears to be the soundest approach.
Yet the reporter in Waterman I was held not to be liable because
the court concluded that the damages asserted by the claimant
were not the proximate result of the loss of the reporter's notes
and that the damages were speculative. This result is open to
question and will be considered at length below; thus, while
Waterman I represents the better view regarding immunity, it is
questionable that the entire reasoning of the court should be
accepted without serious deliberation in light of the usual rules
of proximate causation and specificity of damages.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Upon appeal the appellate division in Waterman v. State, 241 N.Y.S.2d 314
(App. Div. 1963) decided that the reporter's loss'of his notes was the proximate
.cause, reversed the dismissal, and reinstituted the claimants actions. This case is
herein textually referred to as Waterman 11. Finally, the claimants won judgments
in the Court of Claims, ultimately afflrmed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Waterman v. State, 216 N.E.2d 26, 268 N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. 1966).76 Waterman v. State, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
771d..
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V. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND CERTA-NTY OF DAMAcES
A. Waterman I
As the Court of Claims noted in Waterman I, it is not enough
that the reporter's negligence can be shown; the negligence must
be causally related to the damages asserted .7  The court found
the crucial question to be whether the damage sustained by the
claimants was the natural and probable consequence of the
reporter's negligent acts and held that it was impossible to pre-
dict with any certainty what disposition of the case the appellate
division would have made had the appeal actually been per-
fected by the state. The court noted that several possible actions
could have been taken by the appellate court, at least one of
which would have resulted in retrial of the case even if the
reporter's loss had not occurred. The court then concluded
that since the action by the appellate court which would cause
a retrial had the same likelihood of occurrence as any other
action, the court would be forced to indulge in conjecture to
decide that the damages, e.g., the expense of the new trial, flowed
naturally from the loss of the reporter's notes.79 The court stated
that:
... we would have to hold that at the time the Stenographer
misplaced his notes he knew or should have known that the
Appellate Division would not reverse the judgments; or to
state it conversely, that he knew or should have known that
as a natural consequence of his negligence the Appellate Di-
vision would have affirmed the judgment making the expense
of the second trial unnecessary.
We feel that to so hold would be stretching the rule of
proximate cause beyond any limits heretofore fixed by the
Courts. We are constrained to hold as a matter of law that
the damages sustained by these claimants were not the natural
and probable results of the Stenographer's negligence.80
78 Id. at 27. It should be noted that what the court actually said was that the
negligence complained of bad to be the proximate cause of the claimed damages.
In that particular case, that was true; but where the agreved litigant proposes to
sue his own attorney and the reporter is also sued or impleaded, it will be
sufficient that the reporter's negligence be a proximate cause of the damages, in
accordance with accepted principles dealing with concurrent negligence.79 Id. at 28-29.
80 Id.
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The Court of Claims relied upon two New York cases, Cole
v. Vincent,"1 and 25 Fifth Avenue Management Co. v. Ivor V.
Clark, Inc.,82 as authority for this portion of their decision in
Waterman I. A very cogent argument can be made that this
reliance was misplaced and that these cases do not support the
decision in Waterman I that proximate cause was absent. These
cases will be considered at length to determine whether in fact
they do support the decision in Waterman 1, and a third case,
Chaplin v. Hicks, 3 will be discussed as displaying a better analysis
of the problem of proximate cause as well as providing a better
rule to follow.
B. Cole v. Vincent
Cole v. Vincent84 involved a suit against a county clerk and a
title abstract company by the purchaser of a parcel of real estate.
The plaintiff had hired the abstract company to search the title,
and the company was specifically advised of a judgment against
the owner of the property which might affect the marketability
of the title. Upon searching the title the judgment was not found,
presumably because the clerk had not properly recorded it. At
the trial a verdict was directed against both the clerk and the
abstract company. On appeal the court held that the trial court
had been in error in directing a verdict against the county
clerk and that there was "a question of fact as to whether or
not such negligence was a proximate or concurring cause of the
injury sustained by plaintiff." 5
Citing Cole, the Waterman I court quoted the following
passage:
But if the consequences were only made possible by the inter-
vening act of a third party which could not have been reason-
ably anticipated, then the sequential relation between act
and result would not be regarded as so established as to
come within the rule.88
81242 N.Y.S. 644 (App. Div. 1930).
82 112 N.Y.S.2d 117 (App. Div. 1952).
83 [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
84 242 N.Y.S. 644 (App. Div. 1930).
85 Id. at 650.86 Waterman v. State, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22, 29 (Ct. Cl. 1962), citing Cole v.
Vincent, 242 N.Y.S. 644, 651 (App. Div. 1930) (emphasis in original).
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The quotation is correct, but it was preceded in Cole by an anti-
thetical proposition of law, wherein the court said:
If the act of a party sought to be charged is in clear sequence
with the result, and it could have been reasonably anticipated
that the consequences complained of would follow the alleged
wrongful act, it is a proximate cause. 7
Thus, it is apparent that Cole did not at all require the result
reached in Waterman I with regard to proximate cause. Cole,
rather, stands for the proposition that it is a question of fact
whether a county clerk's erroneous indexing of an item caused
or contributed to an injury. Waterman I distorts this principle to
mean that in order to hold the court reporter liable, the court
would have to find that he knew or should have known that the
judgement would have been affirmed, thus obliging the Court
of Claims to hold as a matter of law that the claimants' damages
were not the proximate result of the reporter's negligence. At
first blush, the test employed by Waterman I is a fair one. Upon
reflection, though, it becomes evident that the Waterman I cri-
terion is unsound and unworkable. Just as an attorney cannot
defend himself in a malpractice action solely on the grounds that
he thought the client's case was without merit or that he was
never personally persuaded that an appeal would prevail, neither
should the negligent court reporter be able to escape liability
merely because he thought that the judgement would not be
affirmed. Beyond that, the Waterman I test requires the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the reporter could do the impossible; that
he could with little or no knowledge of the applicable law,
before an appeal was perfected, before briefs were written and
filed and before arguments were heard, foresee exactly how the
appellate court would dispose of the case. Such a requirement
is patently absurd.
Nor is the "reasonably prudent person" approach applicable
to the court reporter situation. An attorney is compared to a
reasonably prudent attorney when his acts of negligence are con-
sidered, but only when the question is whether the proper exercise
of his professional judgement would have caused him to take a
8 Cole v. Vincent, 242 N.Y.S. 644, 650-51 (App. Div. 1930) (emphasis in
original).
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certain course of action. When that issue is raised, he can defend
by arguing that no lawyer is bound to exercise absolutely correct
judgement and that his actions were as prudent as would have
been those of a hypothetical practitioner. In contrast, when the
neglect does not involve the exercise of judgement, as where the
reporter fails to file papers, the reasonableness test is entirely
without validity. The same applies to almost every official act
of the court reporter for, unlike the attorney, he is not vested with
professional discretion, at least not in Kentucky, and has no de-
cisions to make. It is of no legal consequence what a court
reporter, thinking reasonably or unreasonably, might, for example,
conclude about the worth of the appeal. He is a mere amanuensis.
He is instructed by the judge, or the litigants, or both, to take
certain steps, such as preparation of a transcript, and has no
judgement to exercise; he merely executes his duties as instructed.
The Waterman I court failed to recognize this fact and in so doing
lost sight of the real basis of the action against the reporter-that
the litigant has lost his chance of success, that the value of this
lost opportunity represents the damages to the litigant, and that
the probability of a felicitous outcome should affect only the
amount and not the existence of these damages.
C. 25 Fifth Avenue Management Co. v. Ivor V. Clark, Inc.
Fifth Avenue was an action by the owner of certain real estate
against a mortgage broker in which it was alleged that through
the negligent acts and misrepresentations of its officer, the broker
caused the plaintiff to lose an advantageous settlement in a bank-
ruptcy matter and suffer concomitant expenses. The mortgage
broker had been engaged to secure the acceptance of a settlement
by proposing the matter to the trustee in bankruptcy. It was the
practice in such cases to have such an offer submitted by the
trustee to the court, which would then canvass the views of
certificate holders; thereafter, the court would approve or disap-
prove the offer. Recovery was denied on the grounds that the
plaintiff had not proved that the defendant's misconduct was the
cause of any damage, in that the proof had not reached the neces-
sary level of reasonable certainty.8 The court applied the well-
88 25 Fifth Ave. Management Co. v. Ivor V. Clark, Inc., 112 N.Y.S.2d 117
(App. Div. 1952).
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known rule that damages must be ascertainable and not be the
result of conjecture or guesswork.
Again, at least superficially, this case seems to support the
proposition for which it was cited in the Waterman I decision,
but here too a closer examination reveals that the case and the
result reached by citing it are inconsistent. In Waterman I, the
court quoted the following language from Fifth Avenue:
Plaintiff's proof on the subject of damages was required to
establish a loss that flowed naturally and directly from de-
fendant's breach of its engagement. The proof in this regard
lacked that standard of reasonable certainty required to
establish damages.... The fact of damage must be susceptible
of ascertainment in some manner other than mere conjecture
or guesswork....
The fact that a Supreme Court Justice . . . would even-
tually have ratified the proposal was wholly conjectural.8 9
The second paragraph of this quotation is entirely misleading,
for the full passage reads (with the portions deleted in the Water-
man I decision emphasized):
The fact that a Supreme Court Justice would have submitted
the offer of 95 cents to the 250 certificate holders, that the
latter or a majority of them would have accepted the offer, and
that the Supreme Court would eventually have ratified the
proposal was wholly conjectural. 90
The facts of Fifth Avenue reveal that the conjecture does not
relate to what the bankruptcy court would have decided but
that it was conjectural in regard to what 250 individuals, plus the
bankruptcy court, would have done. Manifestly this is to be dis-
tinguished from the consideration of what an appellate court
would do with an appeal before it, for a court is guided by
precedent, persuasive authority, and common sense, or a combi-
nation of all three, which, it is to be presumed, a trial judge could
rightly use to determine what the appellate court would probably
have done. Fifth Avenue, on the other hand, clearly deals with a
89Waterman v. State, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (Ct. Cl. 1962), citing 25 Fifth
Avenue Management Co. v. Ivor V. Clark, Inc., 112 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (App. Div.
1952).
90 25 Fifth Ave. Management Co. v. Ivor V. Clark, Inc., 112 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119
(App. Div. 1952).
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contingency based upon the business desires of 250 individuals,
with an overlay of discretionary action by the bankruptcy court.
The decision in Fifth Avenue was undoubtedly correct, based
upon its facts, but it must be remembered that it deals with
unbridled discretion of individuals and should be limited in its
application, at least not extended to apply to judgments based
upon principles of law.
The court in Fifth Avenue raised the intriguing possibility of
a jury in a collateral proceeding determining what an appellate
court would have decided upon an appeal. Such a decision by a
jury is subject to criticism, but the concept was conveniently
ignored in Waterman I. In Fifth Avenue, the court aptly pointed
out:
In such assumed situation, however, the circumstances would
have to be that a particular result could be reasonably ex-
pected based upon the factual evidence of the merits of the
claim and the applicable law. We have no such situation
or proof here. The determination of the direct proceeding
rested in the discretion of the certificate holders and the
court.91
Thus, it was "incomprehensible that a jury could have found from
the evidence what the decision of the certificate holders and the
court would be other than to guess the result." 2 That is an ac-
ceptable conclusion, and one may readily concede that a judge
could not have divined the collective decision of 250 people, but
this is hardly support for the court's position in Waterman I.
Moreover, in Fifth Avenue the court properly noted that it was
not a case where ". . . the result was to be dependent upon a
fortuitous event, and the defendant prevented the plaintiff from
having the advantage of the chance... ," but rather it was one
in which "the result is dependent upon the mere unrestricted
volition of others-here the volition of the certificate holders plus
the judicial discretion of the Court.... -"3 In distinguishing the
facts of Fifth Avenue from a situation wherein a defendant pre-
vented a plaintiff from having had the advantage of a chance, the
New York court cited the English case of Chaplin v. Hicks.4 A
91 Id. at 120.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 120.
94 [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
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thorough analysis of Fifth Avenue by the Court of Claims in
Waterman I would have necessitated a consideration of Chaplin,
which illustrates the better rule regarding proximate cause and
certainty of damages.
D. The Rule in Chaplin v. Hicks
In the fall of 1908, Eva Chaplin read an advertisement in
the Daily Express, in which Hicks, an actor and lessee of a theater
in London, made a public offer to ladies wishing to become
actresses. He proposed that they complete an application and
send it, together with a photograph and one shilling, to him, after
which he and a committee would select the twenty-four most
beautiful faces among the photographs sent in. The twenty-four
pictures would be published by the newspaper, and its readers
would vote, electing the twelve most beautiful. To the four of
the twelve receiving the greatest number of votes Hicks promised
a theatrical engagement for three years at a salary of £5 a week.
The four having the next highest number of votes would receive
an engagement for three years at £4 a week, and the final four
were also to be awarded three years engagement, but at £8 a
week. Ms. Chaplin accepted the offer by sending her photograph
and shilling with the application form.
Subsequently a modification of the contract occurred, to which
Chaplin did not object. Because so many photographs of beautiful
girls had been received, it had become impossible for Hicks to
select only 24 photographs. The plan was changed to provide
that Hicks would reduce the number of applicants as far as pos-
sible but that the United Kingdom was then to be divided into
ten districts, with the candidates selected by Hicks to be voted on
by readers of the Daily Express in the candidate's district. Out
of the five girls with the highest vote totals in each district, Hicks
was himself to select the twelve winners. In December, Chaplin's
photograph was published, and she headed the poll in her district.
On January 4, 1909, a letter was delivered to the London
residence of Ms. Chaplin, requesting her to see Mr. Hicks on
the sixth of January. Unfortunately, she was out of town and
did not receive the letter until the morning of the 6th. She
immediately wrote, requesting Hicks to advise her of another
time she could see him. She wrote three more times and called
at the theater three times, but Hicks never responded. Finally,
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she Sued- Hicks claiming damages for her loss of the chance of
selection for an engagement which, in addition to the Salary she
would have received, would have been to her professional benefit
At trial, the jury found that Hicks had not taken reasonable steps
to give Chaplin an opportunity to present herself. The court,
after receiving arguments from Hicks' counsel that the alleged
damage was too remote, entered judgment for Chaplin in the sum
of &100.95
The argument for the defendant was analyzed by the court
as containing two propositions: (1) that the asserted damages
were too remote and (2) that the damages were not capable of
assessment. These issues are not essentially different from those
in Waterman. The court defined the applicable standard as
follows:
[T]he test that is generally applied is to see whether... the
damage . . . sought to be recovered flows so naturally or by
express declaration from the terms of the contract.., that it
can be said to be the result of that breach.9
The contract, giving Chaplin a chance of winning one of the
prizes, had been breached by Hicks. The court agreed that a jury
could not in all cases assess damage because it was possible that
a loss resulting from a breach of contract would be so dependent
upon the unrestricted volition of a third person as to make it
impossible to calculate the loss. Yet, as the court noted, Chaplin
had a right to belong to a limited class of competitors, and
where that right was removed wrongfully, the jury could assess
the damage sustained. An accepted measure of damages is not
always necessary and in such cases the jury must simply do its
95 Id.
96 Id. at 790. judge Williams went on to say:
[Ilt is impossible to say that such a result and such damages were not
within the contemplation of the parties as the possible direct outcome of
the breach. I cannot think these damages are too remote....
Id. at 791. But this is not the only means of determining if the breach and the
damages are proximately related. In Otter v. Church, Adam, Tatham & Co., [1953]
1 All E.R. 168 (Ch.), a firm of solicitors was sued for negligence in advising the
plaintiff in a real property matter. There the court stated, after discussing the
contemplations of the parties:
It seems to me impossible in this case to apply the latter [contemplation
of the parties] test having regard to the nature of the breach of contract.
Therefore, I have to consider what are the damages which may naturally
be expected to flow from the breach.
Id. at 170.
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best to make the assessment. Indeed, the court held that the
"existence of a contingency which is dependent on the volition
of a third person is not enough to justify us in saying that the
damages are incapable of assessment . . ."' and that the de-
fendant was liable for the prospective probable loss of the plain-
tiff.0 8
The court found the.argument for the defendant unsound in
its failure to distinguish between the questions of remoteness and
assessment of damages. The former, it held, was an issue for the
judge while the latter was for the jury to decide. 9 The same
English justices would have recognized immediately in Waterman
I that the solution to cases where the reporter's negligence makes
an appeal impossible is to let the trial court, in a subsequent
action against the reporter, decide the question of law (that is,
whether the appeal would have failed or not) and then let the
finder of the fact proceed to the question of damages. This
.approach, unlike that found in Waterman I, is both fair and
workable and should be adopted by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals at the earliest opportunity.
E. The Kentucky Rule
Although no Kentucky case is directly in point, several de-
cisions may serve as guideposts indicating the Court of Appeal's
probable disposition of the questions of proximate cause and
certainty of damages with regard to the liability of court re-
porters. First, the Kentucky legal principles relative to questions
of causation and ascertainment of damages should be examined.
The exact nature of the wrong has little legal significance, except
insofar as the rules governing damages are affected. In Kentucky,
damages recoverable in a tort action must be the natural and
reasonable result of the wrong; while damages recoverable for
breach-of contract are generally those which are reasonably sup-
posed to have been within the contemplation of the parties,10 a
test which is more or less synonymous with foreseeabiity These
standards are hardly peculiar to Kentucky; substantially similar
language was used in Waterman I, Cole, Fifth Avenue and Chap-
97 Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786, 799.
98 Id.
09 Id. at 798.100 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Guard, 139 S.W.2d 722 (Ky. 1940).
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lin. Of course, as previously noted,10 1 these are not rigid rules,
and in an appropriate case damages for breach of contract may
be calculated by the extent to which they naturally flow from
the wrong.1°2 Furthermore, if damages should arise out of special
circumstances surrounding a contract, even though they are "dif-
ferent from those which would naturally and probably flow from
the breach of such a contract," such damages can be recovered if
it is shown that the defaulting party had knowledge of the special
circumstances. 03 Such a variety of tests indicates that the courts
are willing to apply whatever rule is necessary to ensure that
the aggrieved party recovers all reasonable losses. Consequently,
it appears that the theoretical basis of the cause of action against
the court reporter is of little importance, because the courts have
molded the law to insure that in every case the loss, in order to be
recompensed, must be the proximate result of the reporter's fail-
ure. Even if the Waterman I rationale is spurned, the issue of
damages will probably cause little difficulty. If a party suffers a
money judgment and his appeal fails because of the reporter's
inaction, the damages there are liquidated. If a party seeking a
money judgment loses his opportunity to have it, the amount he
probably would have received can easily be determined by the
finder of fact at the second trial.
The only Kentucky case that approaches these questions is
Smitha v. Gentry.104 Therein the appellees had learned of a re-
ward being offered for the arrest of a fugitive and had arranged
for another person to call them with information confirming his
whereabouts. When the informant attempted to telephone the
appellees at Smitha's store, Smitha, instead of conveying the
message to them, used the information, arrested the man, and
collected the reward himself. The appellees received a judgment
at the trial, but on appeal the judgment was reversed. The Court
of Appeals held that the appellees were deprived of nothing more
than the opportunity to attempt to earn the reward before some-
one else did, which was little different than the loss of an oppor-
tunity to compete for a public prize or to enter a horse in a race.
So many contingencies could cause failure in each example that
101 See Otter v. Church, Adams, Tatham & Co., [1953] 1 All E.R. 168 (ch.).
102 Staves Mfg. Corp. v. Robertson, 128 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1939).
103 Hogg v. Edley, 32 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Ky. 1930).
104 45 S.W. 515 (Ky. 1898).
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the loss from the deprivation of the right to compete for the
reward was considered too remote to form the basis of an action
at law.10 5 The Court concluded that "there is no way of showing
that any loss or damage was suffered by them, except a nominal
one.... Their injury was the loss of a naked possibility." 06
Obviously, the Court considered the damages too remote,
for if nominal damages could be recovered there has been an
injury. If there is a cause of action and damages are reasonably
ascertainable, there is no reason why the Court of Appeals should
fail to find for the party who was deprived of his opportunity.
In this respect, it is clear that Smitha is not fundamentally op-
posed to Chaplin, in view of the differences in the probability of
a culmination of events favorable to the plaintiffs in the two cases.
F. The New York Supreme Court Opinion in Waterman II
After the Court of Claims rendered its opinion, an appeal was
taken by the claimants and their attorney, wherein the appellate
division held that the Court of Claims erred in holding that the
stenographer's negligence was not the proximate cause of the
damages.0 7 The court stated that:
The question of proximate cause, under the circumstances of
this case, is a question of the facts. The Court below seems to
have felt that the damages were speculative and conjectural
since the Appellate Division might have reversed the decision
in favor of the claimants even if a proper record had been
perfected but it seems to us that this is the wrong way to
look at the case. The loss of the minutes was the direct
proximate cause of the need for a new trial. The damages
in the way of loss of interest and expenses of retrial were con-
sequences of the stenographer's negligence. The liability thus
established prima facie cannot be escaped by speculating that
the damage might have occurred anyway. 08
The Appellate Division went on to dismiss the claim of the
attorney, however, on the grounds that he was not a party to the
original action and as such had no personal claim against the
105 Id. at 516.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
10 7 Waterman v. State, 241 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 1963), affd sub nom.
Williams v. State, 200 N.E.2d 212, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1964).
108 Id.
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State of New York; the court reporter, in the court's opinion,
owed the attorney no duty whatsoever."0 9 It should be noted,
however, that the court also held that if the claimants had been
required to pay additional attorney's fees for a second trial, such
additional expenses would be included in the sum awarded to
them as a result of the negligence of the reporter. Allowing a
claim by the attorney, therefore, would have been a possible
improper duplication of that award."0 The decision of the Ap-
pellate Division in Waterman 11 is sound both in result and
reasoning and thus provides an excellent example for Kentucky
courts to follow should the same question arise in this jurisdiction.
Logically the reporter should not be entitled to immunity and
should be held responsible for his negligent acts.
VI. EFFECT OF ATToRNEY's NEGLIGENCE
If an appellant who is injured by the reporter's sole negligence
is not granted relief by the court, he has lost his opportunity
for redress on the original action; even if a remedy is granted,
both the successful litigant and his attorney will have suffered
expense and inconvenience due to the reporter's error. In each
of these situations both the attorney and his client have actionable
rights against the court reporter, including the right of the at-
torney to cross claim against the reporter or implead him, in the
event of an action against the attorney by his client.
The alternate situation is one in which the attorney con-
tributes to the negligence of the reporter. It will be seen that a
court will seldom grant relief where an attorney has contributed
to the delay prejudicing his client's rights, for even if the rules of
the court require the reporter to take some action, the appellant
may not sit idly by. He is bound to exercise reasonable diligence
to see that the reporter complies with his legal obligations, and
where the only step taken to obtain the record is an occasional
inquiry of the reporter as to the progress of the transcript, there
is no justification for relief from default."' In this regard it should
again be noted that the reporter in Kentucky has no duty to
insure that appellate papers are filed or to obtain extensions of
109 Id. at 319 (Williams, P.J., speaking for the majority in a separate opinion).
110 Id. at 320 (Williams, P.J., speaking for the majority in a separate opinion).
l' Caldwell v. Harvey, 192 P.2d 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
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time in which to file such papers.112' Contribution to the delay by
the attorney may be critical and certainly must be considered in
determining ultimate liability.
If the attorney's negligence is determined to be contributory
or superseding,113 he has no cause of action aga'inst the reporter;
and in view of his status as the client's agent during the coudrse
of the litigation,'14 the client is also ordinarily barred from a direct
action against the reporter. On the other hand, if the attorney's
negligence is merely concurrent, the client will have a cause of
action against both the attorney and the xeporter, and the attor-
ney may well have rights over against the reporter for. con-
tribution." 5
VII. OmER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Respondeat Superior
Any litigant who obtains a judgment is confronted with the
practical problem of collecting it. At the .present time .a. mal-
practice insurance policy similar to those held by physicians
and attorneys is probably not available to court reporters, and
while a reporter's employment may provide him a comfortable
income, it is unlikely to make him wealthy. Thus, anyone :re-
covering a judgment against a reporter will necessarily have to
explore all possibilities of collection, among them collection from
the state itself on the basis of respondeat superior.
Such an attempt would likely be unavailing, however, since
even though the reporter is a state employee (if. not a state
officer), recovery against the employer-state via respondeat:su-
perior would be impossible in most jurisdictions due to the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity. In Waterman I, the Court of Claims
applied respondeat superior, but only because New York in its
Court of Claims Act has waived immunity in such situations." 6
Therefore, unless the state has a tort claims act covering .negli-
112 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Paul's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950).
113 See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Vincent, 412 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1967).
114Childers v. Potter, 165 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1942); Douthfitt v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 31 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. 1930).115 See Parker v. Redden, 421S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967).
16 The appellate court agreed with the Court of Claims that the stenog'aipher
was not a judicial officer, making respondeat superior a doctrine of possible a
plication, but stated that the exact- relationship of the reporter to the state shoud
be further developed at the trial since it might appear'that the reporte is an
independent contractor. . . . .'-"
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gence of a state employee, the doctrine of respondeat superior
will not facilitate the collection of a judgment against a reporter.
B. Civil Rights Act
The Civil Rights Act of 187111 imposes liability upon anyone
who
* .. under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any state or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws .... I's
Under that Act, one convicted of a crime has a cause of action
against a reporter who refuses to comply with court orders di-
recting him to furnish a transcript of the testimony taken at the
trial.1 9 The advantages of such an action under the Civil Rights
Act are multiple, the most important of which is that it is not a
petition to obtain the transcript, but rather is an action for dam-
ages for the failure to provide it. Thus, if the transcript is pro-
vided subsequent to the suit being brought against the reporter,
the fact that the wrong alleged in the complaint is not continuing
is irrelevant to the existence of a cause of action. Moreover,
since the Civil Rights Act allows such actions to be brought in a
federal court, the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies is
eliminated. Finally, the absence of actual prejudice from the
reporters action, and absence of actual damages, does not defeat
an action under the Civil Rights Act because even though actual
damages are not sustained, nominal and punitive damages may
be recovered. 120 As against a reporter, however, the Civil Rights
Act is of use only in proceedings involving state court reporters,
since the judicial immunity granted the reporter in federal courts
is not abolished by the Civil Rights Act' 12 and since that Act is
aimed only at state action. Furthermore, Stewart v. Minnicklc 22
established that if the defense of judicial immunity is properly
11742 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
118 Id. § 1983.
119 Washington v. Official Court Stenographer, 251 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
120 Id. at 947.
121 Dieu v. Norton, 411 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1969); Peckham v. Scanlon, 241
F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1957).
12 409 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1969).
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raised, it may apply even to a state court reporter in a federal
action. As previously noted, however, this should not be an
automatic finding in the federal court but should depend upon
the immunity of the reporter vel non under the laws of the par-
ticular state.
VIII. RECOMMzNDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Recommendations
As in several other jurisdictions, 23 failure to perform his
duties may subject the court reporter in Kentucky to criminal
penalties. KRS § 28.990(5) provides:
A reporter guilty of wilful or corrupt misconduct or neglect
in the discharge of any of the duties required of him by any
of the provisions of KRS 28.410 to 28.480 shall be fined not
more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned in the
county jail not more than six (6) months.
Even so, such steps may be of little comfort to one who has suf-
fered monetary damages. A number of state legislatures have
solved this problem by requiring the reporter to post a bond to
protect innocent parties from his failure to faithfully discharge
his duties. 24 Using those statutes as models, it is recommended
that the Kentucky General Assembly enact legislation similar to
the following:
Proposed KRS § 28.420: Oath; Bond; Appointment and Bond
to be Recorded; Action on Bond; Penalty for Wilful Neglect
of Duty.
1. Every person appointed as a court reporter under the au-
thority of KRS § 28.410, or appointed as court reporter pro
tempore in any judicial proceeding by agreement of court
and parties, shall, before entering upon the discharge of his
duties, take an oath before the judge of the court or division
for which he is appointed to faithfully discharge the duties
of his office. The appointment of the reporter and the fact
of his having qualified shall be entered upon the order book
of the court. The reporter shall thereby be deemed an officer
of the court.
12= E.g., F LA. STAT. A N. § 889.24 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-911
(1968); MIss. CODE AwN. § 9-1845 (1972).
124 See statutes compiled supra note 25.
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2. Every such person shall furnish a bond for the faithful
performance of the duties of his office. The bond shall.be in
the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, or such larger
sum as the court may fix, and shall be subject to the approval
of the appointing court. "The bond shall be in favor of the
court making the appointment, any party litigant and any
party litigant's attorney, for the purpose of 'protecting the
court, counsel and litigants against any acts of incompetence
or misconduct on the part of the reporter. The-bdnd'shall be
filed in the Circuit Clerk's Office of each county in the judicial
.district for which the appointment is made, or.in the Circuit
Clerk's Office for the county in which the pro. tempore court
reporter is serving.
3. If .any person shall be injured or aggrieved by default
of th6 reporter ihis capacity as 6fficer of the court, such
person so injured or aggrieved may bring suit on the re-
poiter's bond for any damages sustained.
4. If any court reporter shall neglect or refuse to transcribe
his official notes and to file such transcription within the time
a and in the manner required by law, or by order of the court
or judge, he shall be liable upon his. bond for a penalty in the
.amount of five.hundred .dollars,- to be recovered. by the party
aggrieved thereby,- whether the person aggrieved has suffered
any actual damage or not.
5. Any remedies given by this act shall not be construed to
limit any other remedy which would otherwise exist, but shall
be cumulative in effect..
B. Conclusion
The last section of the proposed legislation specifically- pro-
vides -that remedies granted, thereby are not to be exclusive of
any other existing remedies: Those other remedies, the common
law actions fbr negligence or breach of contract, 'should be en-
forced in kentucky. Since the Kentucky Court of Appeals has
adopted the.view that in the performance of his duties the re-
porter is no different from any other recognized officer of the
court, 25 this approach should be brought to its logical conclusion.
The Court of Appeals, if confronted with an appropriate case,
should hold that the reporter is a mere employee of the Common-
125 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Paul's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. 1950).
[Vol. 62
1974] COURT REPORTERS 995
wealth, and not an officer- granted immunity. If the case deals
with a reporter hired by the parties with the consent of the court,
thus making the reporter a de facto officer of the court, the re-
porter should be deemed an independent contractor, not entitled
to immunity under any rule.
The Court of Appeals should further apply its usual and
normal rules regarding causation to cases involving reporters mis-
conduct. By reason of these legal principles, if it is found that
but for the act of the reporter the complaining litigant would
have achieved his goal, then only the question of damages should
remain for the finder of fact. Only when such a stance is firmly
adopted will litigants in Kentucky's courts be assured of adequate
protection from the reporter who fails to copy and record "what
is right and true".
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APPENDIX A
STANDARDS OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICIAL
COURT REPORTERS
(Resolution of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sep-
tember 1944 session, rpt. 13-14)
Be it Resolved:
1. That persons appointed as court reporters of the United
States district courts shall be capable of reporting accurately
verbatim by shorthand or mechanical means, proceedings before
the court at a rate of 200 words a minute, and furnishing a cor-
rect typewritten transcription of their notes with such promptitude
as may be requisite. They shall demonstrate familiarity with the
terminology used in the courts, and shall be persons of unques-
tionable probity;
2. That the method of determining these qualifications in
each particular case be left to the appointing court which will
have a vital interest in securing for the reporting of its pro-
ceedings only persons who are competent and upright. The
Conference suggests that the district judges may properly take
into consideration the experience of applicants who have been
reporting in the courts and may appoint without examination
such reporters as are known to them to possess through such
experience the necessary qualifications. The Conference also sug-
gests that judges would be justified in treating as qualified with-
out examination:
(1) Persons presently engaged in reporting court proceedings
in the locality and known to the appointing court to be
competent; (2) persons holding certificates of proficiency from
the National Shorthand Reporters Association, or state or local
shorthand reporters' associations known to the appointing
judges to base such certificates on merit; or (3) persons hold-
ing certificates of proficiency issued by states which have pro-
visions for the examination and certification of shorthand
reporters;
3. That where examination of applicants is necessary to de-
termine their qualifications, the Conference suggests that the ap-
pointing judge appoint a Committee composed of members of the
bar or court reporters or both to conduct such examinations.
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APPENDIX B
QUALIFICATIONS AND COMPENSATION PLAN FOR
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS
1. An Applicant for appointment hereafter as an official court
reporter in the United States district courts shall possess as
a minimum requirement:
(a) At least four years of prime court reporting experience in
the free lance field of service or service in the lower courts
or a combination thereof;
(b) A certificate of proficiency from the National Shorthand
Reporters Association; or
(c) A certificate from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts stating that he has passed an examination
conducted under the auspices of the Administrative Office.
Such a qualified person shall, upon appointment, receive the
starting salary for court reporters set by the Judicial Confer-
ence plus transcript fees;
2. All official court reporters who have satisfactorily served the
United States district courts as official court reporters for 10
years shall receive a 10% increase over the starting salary set
by the Judicial Conference for court reporters.
3. A holder of a certificate of merit from the National Shorthand
Reporters Association (or the equivalent therefore established
by the Administrative Office) shall after five years of satis-
factory service as official court reporter receive a 10% increase
over the starting salary set by the Judicial Conference for court
reporters;
4. The recommendation of the employing court is prerequisite
for advancement to the 10% salary increase. The salary rates
above-mentioned may be adjusted upwards whenever there
is a statutory pay increase for judiciary employees generally;
5. All initial appointments shall be on a probationary basis to be
fixed by the employing court;
6. This Plan shall be administered by the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, under the
general direction and supervision of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. The requirements of Item 1, above, may
be subject to modification where special problems exist.
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